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Are Trade Deficits a Problem?
K. Alec Chrystal and Geoffrey E. Wood
N 1986, the U.S. trade deficit exceeded $140 billion.
Such substantial tr-ade deficits often ar-c consider-ed a
sign ofweakness in the economy. While this situation
is something of a noyelty for the United States, many
other countries have had trade deficits off and on
throughout the poslwai- period.
‘the purpose of this article is to explain what is
meant by trade deficits within the context of the bal-
ance of payments, to outline the circumstances under
which the state of the balance of payments may lie
symptomatic of a problem, and to considei- what this
analysis implies currently For- the United States. With
r-egard to the last, we will suggest that concern about
the U.S. trade deficit has been overstated. Indeed, a
trade deficitcan he indicative ofa healths’and strongly
growing economy.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT’S
ACCOUNTS
‘I’he balance of payments accounts area recoi-d of
transactions between domestic residents and the r-est
of the world over’ a specific period of time. Like any
double entry bookkeeping system, the balance of pay—
ments accounts must balance.’ There is nothing mys-
ter-ious atiout this, nor does it involve any statement
about how the wor-Id works.
The simplest foi-m in which the balance of pay-
ments accounts can be expressed is as follows:
Ill CA + K+F 0 ,
where CA is the curi-ent account balance, Kis net non—
ollicial capital flows and F is official reserve financing.
‘l’hese items ai-e defined in such a way that thes’ must
sum to zero. Let us consider each of them in turn.
Current ii.ccount
The current account has two major components.
‘l’hese are the trade balance and the services or ‘‘invisi—
tiles’’ balance. ‘the fonner, which generally gets the
most attention, is the difference between the value of
goods exported and the value of goods imported.
These exports and imports are of physical objects
which, in pr-iiciple, could lie observed crossing the
border, In contr’ast, ‘‘inyisibles’’ are services forwhich
international payments are made hut that do riot
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involve the direct transfer of a physical product. For
example, if a New York shipping company were to
insure acargowith Lloyds of London, the purchase of
that insurance contract would represent an invisible
import for- the United States and an invisible export for
the United Kingdom.
tnvisibles take many differ-emit forms. Two examples
ar-e worth mentioning in addition to such financial
services as insurance arid banking. Fir-st,ifanation has
either assets or liabilities overseas, the net payment of
interest or- dividends is measur-ed as an inyisilile im-
port or expori. A positive net return on foreign assets is
counted as an invisible export, because itgenerates an
inflow rifpayments into the economy just as an export
of goods does. Second, international tourism is
counted as part of the invisible component of the
cur-rent account. If U.S. citizens spend more on over--
seas trips than for-eigners spend tin U.S. vacations, it is
measured as an invisible net import iii the U.S. balance
of payments.
Non4Jfficiai (Inpita! Account
The capital account of the balance of payments
measures the change in net indebtedness between the
domestic econoni~ and the rest of the world. tt is
important to get this clear, as there is sometimes
confusion about what the capital account contains, it
does not involve imports and exports of capital goods,
such as machine tools amid computer-s. These ar-c all
lihysical goods, and their import and export arethere-
fore counted in the trade account. The capital account
involves the transfer of financial claims of various
kinds. ‘these claims are r-eferred to as “capital’’ be-
cause they represent claims to interest or dividend
payments and, in the case of company shares, do
inyolye ownership of underlying r-eal assets.
The ter-miriology commonly used to describe the
capital account is rather confusing when it is related
to the way in which capital account items ar’e niea—
sured. In the current account of the balance of pay—
merits, goods leaving the country is measured as a
plus item. Itt the capital account, however, what is
generally called a capital ‘‘outflow is measured as
negative. Only the terminolo~’here is confusing, how-
ever; accounts at-c quite logical. What we mean liv a
capital outflow is that domestic residents al-c buying
for’eign assets. In other words, they are ‘‘importing’’
foreign shares, titles or securities. Thus, all purchases
offoreign goods, securities (stocks, bonds, hills) or any
other-asset ar-cmeasured as negative limportsh and all
sales to for’eigners at-c measured as positive (exports)
irrespective of whether they ar-c goods sales or asset
sales.
Itt principle, the capital account of the balance of
payments measures the change in the net asset/
liability position between the home economy and the
r’est of the world. VVe say ‘‘in principle’’ because there
is one r-espect in which this is not corr’ect. The capital
account measur’es the value of thenet flow of financial
instruments (stocks. bonds, bills, etc.) that passes be-
tween doriiestic and over-seas residents. But the exter-—
nal indebtedness of an economy changes not just as
assets change hands. It also changes as a result of
changes in values of assets that have not (:hanged
hands. F’or’ example, U.S. residents may own shares in
Rolls Rowe which r-ise in value. ‘this capital gain lot’
loss) element of the external asset/liability position is
not measured as part (if the balance of payments
accounts until it is realized by an asset sale. Only the
flon’ offinancial claims is included.
Official Balance
The final item in the balance of payments accounts
is the lialance for- official financing. This comprises
changes in the official foreignexchange reserves of the
domestic economy. These i-eserves are mainly claims
against foreign governments or’ central banks), for
example, Fed holdings of Deutsche marks. For most
countries, reserves al-c held as a means of intervening
in foreign exchange markets to suppor-t the value of
the domestic currency.4 This item is a special official
sector’ component (if the capital account. It is tr’eated
separately for- historical 1-easons associated with the
fixed exchange rate system which operated almost
worldwide from World War II until 1973.’ Under a
freely floatingexchange i-ateregime, theofficial financ-
ing balance is always zero. If F’ in equation I is zer-o,
clearly, CAand K must be equal and of opposite sign.
(i~& Balance of.Pavinents
Table I shows the U.S. balance of pavnx emits for 1986.
It shows a curr-ent account deficit of a little over $141
billion. Thecur-rent account is made up of items I and
2, The caprtal account surplus of 5117 billion is shown
in lines 3 and 4. Changes in U.S. official reserves ar-c
shown in line 5. There was a very small fall of $0312
billion in 1956 a plus sign indicates a decline hi
holdings of foreign assets). ‘l’his indicates that the U.S.
authorities intervened little during 1986 as a whole.
‘Some have claimed that the United States has become a net debtor
vis-a-visthe rest of the world. This claim ignores the capital gains on
U.S-ownedforeign assets; in reality, the United States is likely still
to have positive net external assets.
‘See Balbach (1978).
‘See Batten and Off (1983).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFSt LOUIS JANUARVIVEBRUARY ION
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I hus the (lominant picture is onc of t. S. r esidcnts
buying more goods and senices os erseas than forengn
esidents are bus irig 6 om thc United Statcs mid of
foreigners im n (a big their n t holding of claims
against the I nited States.
\otice hoytem en that there is afaith large tatrstical
disn n cpancs . I he pr-escnt. e (if this discrepan( y indr—
rates that thc data do not include some trade amid or
apital flow . While it is impossible to sax mxhen e the
man cur tcies arisn it is olten pr (-sum~ d that thc great-
(‘St ( rn’ors inc likely to lie in the apital a count pr’i—
mm ily be( ause asset Iransler’s it e more dilfir utt to
keep r ~((in ds on tl the (tata had nio omissiomis then
the cur rent and (apit ml ac ounts Inmhiding offrcial
flosm.s m\ould add to zeno.
It is not (ilimious at first gl,u’u vt lix the ( urn rnt arid
(-apital accounits must offset ea Li otli( i cx tt. tlv V~ hat
xiould happen it they did not’ Suppo for example
that at (tIl n (-nit exchange r-ates a ((iuntrx is r unning a
( urnent accounit delu it but its planned net (‘ipital
lIons ar( zcno. Thi meanis that the n niunitrs is ti-sing to
spend mon r (in llil~Olts than forcigner’s ate mmrIling to
sliend on its exports. This will pn-oduce an imbalance
in its fon-eign exchange mat-ket.” Attempted sales of
doniestic currency for foreign curremicyl will exceed
attempted purchases. The market value of the cun—
rencs’ will fall until the quantity of the currency de-
manded is equal to that supplied. At this point~either
the current account hasadjusted so that it is no longer
in deficit, or the net expont of assets (induced as assets
in the countn-y became cheapen-, through domnestic
currency devaluation, and thus more attractim’e to for-
eigner’s, and prices of foreign assets hecaniie higher
arid hence less attractive to U.S. citizens) is just equal
to the cut-rent account deficit, ‘l’hius, the exchange rate
will adjust to ensure that tlie current and capital
accounts are exactly (iffsetting.
‘Fhenst is nothing niiagical about this outcome. ‘the
end result is the same for’ anyindividual. Ifyou spend
mon-c than your income, yoti niust bor’row or sell the
equivalent valr,ne of your- assets to coverthe difference;
if you spend less than your income, you must inevita—
hlv acquire increased claims (in someone else. Simi-
lar-Is’, anation that n.nns acun’ent account deficit mnust
either hon-n-owfroni ahnoad (in- sell off soniie ofits assets,
whether’ these assets are domestic or foreign. Like-
wise, a curremit account surplus must lie associated
with either an increase of claims oni foi’eigniens or a
reduction of previous borrowings.
Another implicatiomi of the definition of balance (if
payments is the following identity:
12) (‘,~ GNP-~GDE.
‘I’he current accoumit surplus Ion- minus the current
account deficit) is equal to gross national pr’oduct
minus gross domestic expenditun-e. This identity
shows that the (:urrent accotint of the tialance of
pavnients is the difierence betweeni the value ofwhat
the nation produces and what it s1)en~(ls~.’l’he former
)GNP) cami also be thought (if as the value of the
nation’s gross income. Identity (2) is useful Iiecan.nse it
makes clean’ that any nation that spends n’iore than it
produces will have a trade deficit. ‘l’he interesting
question, of course, is whether such an imbalance is
good on’ bad.
WHAT MAKES THE CURRE.I”i’
ACCOUNT BALAINCE A PROBLEM?
The niatui’e of what is usually termed a balance (if
1iay’ments pn’ohlem varies considen-ablv, dependinig
‘See Chrystal (1984).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARV’FEBRUARY 1988
n.npon mx-hethen’ the country in question has a fixed or a
floatinig exchange n-ale regime. The prolilem pn’othnced
byadeficit on the current ac:count can lie most acute if
the miation is mnaintaining a fixed exchange n-ate n-c—
gime! In this case, ‘‘the problem’’ is felt directly by the
central hank.
Maintaining a fixed exchanige tate vis—a-vis one or
niiore countries n’equin’es the pegging nations central
hianik to hold foreigni c’xchange i’eserves with which to
intervene in the for-eign exchange market. This inter-—
ventiomi can be necessary to stop the exchange rate
from i’nioving in either’din’ertion, Stnppose, for example~
that the countt-v has a current account deficit amid nio
desired net pn’ivate capital flows. In order’ to maintain
the existing exchange rate, the central bank must sell
fon-eigmi exchange for’ its domestic cun-n-enicy. Whether
the origin or source of the niet supply nif domestic
currency in foreigni exchange niar-kets is fror’n the
current or capital account side of the balance (if pam’—
merits is in-n-elevant. The domestic curn-enicy value of
nesenves sold in a particular’ period is the official
financing balance, I-’, in equation I. Because it involves
the sale to foneignen’s ofa domestically held asset, a net
loss of n-esen’ves is measur-ed as positive in the hialanice
of paymemits accounts.
Under a fixed exchamige rate regime, exchange i-ate
pn’essun-e poses a probleni ifthe central hianik imi ques—
tion starts to run out of foreign exchange reserves,
This possibility riiakes the lin’oliheni wor’se hiecause
holders of the domestic currency, fearinig a devalua-
tioni, will try to lilly foreign currenc\’. Specmnlatim’e sales
of the domnestic clnr-rencm’ in foreign exchange markets
force the central bank to sell even more foreign cx—
chamige n’eserves. Inevitably, the nation must eitbien
(levalue its curn-ency or intn-oduce measun-es to cut
doniestic spendimig Iincludin’ig speniding on fon-eign
goods). This action is unayoidable; othiern’ise, the cen—
tn-al bank will run out of foneigmi exchange reserves.
This descn-ibes the nature of most balamice of pay—
mnemits crises experienced by countries attempting to
maintain fixed exchange n-ates in the 1950s and 1960s.
It is worth noting, homyeven’, thiat the United States
under the postwar- ‘‘tlr’ettoni Woods’’ n-egime was niot
the same as other countries.’AlI oIlier counitrnes in the
systerni pegged tbein’ cur’n’encies to the (hollar’and held
‘The exception to this is when a currency is depreciating at a tast
rate. This is asymptom of acute internal problems normally associ-
ated with hyperinflation.
dollar reserves for this purpose. The United States,
tbien’efone, did miot need to support its own exchange
n-ate and, in fact, did not hold significant reserves of
fon-eign cun-renicv dun-ing thus period.’
Since the sprinig of 1973, when all the major inidus—
tr’ial countries moved to a floating exchange n-ate re-
gime the United Kingdnirii h’iad floated in June 1972).
the natur-e (if hialance of paynienits problems has
changed.’ tJuder a floating exchange rate system, a
central hank does riot have to n.nse its foreigni exchange
reserves to tiniatice a deficit in the nioni—official part of
thie balance of payments; iii fact, ther-e will lie none.’’
In equatinin 1 above, the ten-m F’ beconies zero. Instead
of central hank intervenition, the exchange rate moves
to assure that the cnnn’n-ent account and the capital
account sum to zero on their’ own.
WHY WORRY A.BOUT THE rraiIiw~.
BALANCE?
Concei-n about the state of the trade tialance has a
long history. It is useful to put thus concern mi histori—
(:al context, as it leads niatinn-aliy tn theanalysis ofn’hien
such concern is justified.
In the following discussion, we take it as gim’eni that
trade itself is hienieficial, apoint not clean-Is’ established
until Ricar-do’s famous demonistn-ation’n published in
1817. There was, however, sonic connection histoni—
calls’ betweeni the case against ti-ade deficits anid the
under-standing of mmdiv trade mi genien-aI was a gniod
thiinig. Onils’ when the gains from trade mmccc pi-operly
understood could hieolile begin tni make sensihile as-
sessments of the cause and effect of ti’ade deficits.
The context mi which the earls’ debates took place
was an interriatiomial econiomy in which payments for’
exten’nah trade were lat-gely made mi precious metals,
especially gold. ‘the effect of runirninig a trade surplus
was that a niationi would accumulate gold. In many
‘The U.S. authorities agreed to convert dollars into gold at $35 per
ounce. This commitment was abandoned for all but official holders
in March 1968 and for official holders in August 1971. See Batten
and Ott (1983) tor evidence on exchange market intervention.
“Note that even today the malority of small countries peg their
exchange rates to either a maior currency or a weighted basket of
currencies. Reserve shortages still may cause acute problems for
them.
“fact, none of the malor currencies are floating freely. All the mahor
central banks have intervened from time to time to influence ex-
change rates. Intervention to support the dollar has been especially
heavy since the “Plaza Accord” of September 1985.
‘The system was named after the place in New Hampshire where the
final negotiations setting it up were held in July 1944.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1968
people’s minds, the accumulation (if gold itself he—
camne the ohiject of trade: trade surpluses were ‘‘good’’
and tn-ade deficits ‘‘bad. ‘‘ Tradimig in order to Iiuihd up
gold holdings became knriwn as men-cantihisni.
Mercantihisniwas criticized by several eminent wi-it—
ers, including hiam’id [fume it 752Uwho showed thiat a
conitinininnig trade surplus was unattainiable. An exist-
ing tn-ade surplus, he rioted, pn’oduces an inflow of
gold. Because gold is a fon’mn of nioney, the quantity of
money mi the counitmv rises. ‘hiiis, mi turn, produces a
rise in finices, whichi continiues as long as mon’e gold
flows in. As the (:olnnitrys griods liecome nior-e expemi—
sive relative to those pn-oduced oven’seas, homvever’,
fewer’ will be boughit, ev’entmnalls’ eliminating the tn-ade
sun-plus
Sonic yeats later, Dam’id Ricar’do 118171 used this
demonstn-ation to shomm’ why tn-ade deficits occumn-ed.
this aniswer to this question bm’inigs us directly to our
cenitn-al point: tm’ade deficits cani n-esult from a m’an-iety of
sources, niot all of mmdi ichi an’e ‘‘biad.’’
RICARDO, ~ frf()\f AT\ID ‘FIHDE
DEnCITS~:::
Ricardo argued that a tn-anledeficit was the inem’ita—
tile consequence of prices in the deficit country hieing
‘‘too highi,’’’h’hese prices, mi turni, wet-c tirocluced by
excessim’e prior nnonietary expansion from domestic
son.nrces that were unrelated to ~uior tn-ade sn.rrpluses.”
He argued, in other’ won’ds, that excessive monetary
expansioni was ni(it onily a sufficient condition for a
trade deficit to occur, itwas also anecessary condition
and vice ven’sa fnir tn’ade sun-pluses.
This descr’ibies what happened imi mans’ cniumitn-ies
dun’inig the h%r’etton Woods r’egime. While this se-
quence of events por-tr’ays a commnoni cat.rse of tn’ade
deficits, however-, it is nnit the (inky cause. In the 65—
s’ear period hietween 1830 and 1895, the United States
had a cun-n-enit account deficit in almost em’en’y year’;
them-c sm’em’e only 13 s’ean’s mi which a sun’plus was
recorded. Yet this was miot a period of sustained in—
“Hume, although dealing explicitly with the mercantilist argument,
dealt implicitlywith the notionthat an export surplus is necessary for
growth. Since a perpetual export surplus is impossible, if an export
surplus were essentialfor growth, growth would have stopped. It did
not, however, and to date has not.
“An extensive discussion of the ground covered in this section can be
found in Perlman (1986).
“The issue of domestic bank notes partially backed by gold was a
topic of controversy between the “currency” and “banking” schools
through the 19th century in Britain.
tlation.’ Indeed, it was a period of rapid and ~in~—
longed economic gn-omm’th. ‘hhen’e is thus at least onie
counten’examphe and a rniajor one ‘—‘-- to Ricardo’s
gemien-ahizatiomi.How can this tie explainied?
At the time Rican’do was wn’itinig, his claim was
disputed, most notably, his’ Henry Thom’nton. ‘l’hionntoni
an-gued that, although prior excessive niiorie\’ expan-
sion was indeed sufficient to pn-oduce a tn’ade deficit, it
was not a niecessan’m’ condition for a tn’ade deficit,
‘thornton distinguished between tr-ade deficits aris-
ing fnonii n-cal causes and those an’isimig fr-om excessive
money creation. The former can occur because inidi-
vnduals in a countny want to spend more than their
cun’enit income, that is, they wish to n-educe their net
financial wealth or incr-ease their’ net indebtednen,s.”
tn terms of equation 2 abom’e, anything that causes
domestic spending to exceed output will produce a
trade delicit.
Of coum’se, the balance of paymmienits deficit from this
cause can niot per-sist forever. It will disappear when
indim’iduals have reached their’ new lowen’ desired
wealth level; iii the same mannen-, a trade deficit pn-o—
duced by excess money creation will end when the
excess mnoniem’ has been’i dispersed overseas or
deflated by higher pricesn.”
In summary, a tn’ade deficit can he produced niot
just by excess monetary expanisioni, tiut by dissam’ing.’’
hioth of these will Iin’oduce deficits that are tempom’arv;
hioweven’, these deficits will lie eliminated em’entualls’
[is’ different mechanisnis. Dissam’inig arid the associ-
ated decline in financial wealth can he produced by
several facton-s; examnining some major (ines helps to
uniden-stand the cur-n-emit Ln.S. situation.
“For more details on this, seeMudd and Wood (1978) and Friedman
and Schwartz (1963).
“This highlights the fact that a trade deficit can be a symptom of a
problem, but is not itself a problem. Alternatively, it may be a
symptom ofsomething that is not a problem at all.
“Note that, when we talk about a “lowerdesired wealth level,” we are
referring only to financial wealth, If financial assets are being con-
verted into physicalcapital, thecomposition rather thanthe level of
wealth is changing. If the physical capital offers a greater rate of
return than financial assets, this change actually will increase peo-
ple’s wealth. This distinction is central to the argument that a trade
deficit associated with high levels of domestic real investment could
lead tofaster real growth, increased wealth and higher output in the
future.
“Monetary expansion need not always lead to a trade deficit. In a
classic paper, Robert Mundell (1963) showed that, with perfect
capital mobility, floating exchange rates and sticky goods prices,
monetary expansion causes capital outflows (purchasesof foreign
assets). This causes the currency to depreciate and results in a
current account surplus. Similar results are found in the modern
“overshooting” literature.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FE8RUARY 1988
WHY SHOULD THERE BE DISSAVING?
In on-den’ to discuss the possible soun’ces ofdissaving
in the domestic economy, it is conm’eniient to set out
another identity:”
131 CA = iS—hi + IT—C).
This shows that the ctimnent account sun-plus must be
equal to the excess of pn-ivate saving (iver private in-
vestment IS — II, plus the govem-nment tiudget sun-plus
IT — Cl. In other’wor-ds, the surplus forthe econioms’ as
a whole can lie bn’oken down into thie private sector’
sum’plus plus the public sector surplus. This classifica-
tion suggests possible dim-ectiomis imi which to look fon
causes of the tm-adedeficit: a fall in private saving, a misc
in pn-ivate investment oran incn’ease in thegom’en-nment
budget deficit,
A fall in private saving must be associated with an
incm’ease in consunption relative to income. This
could happen if then-e were atempon’an~fall in income
due, for’example, to acrop failure or’ anatural disaster.
It is well established that, at timnes wheni income is
abnormally how, people attempt to maintain their- con-
suntnptiori patterns by dissavnng. tf the nation as a
whole does this, it will necessarily inm’olve a tn’ade
deficit. It should be emphasized that, while cm-op fail-
un-es or other’ natun’al disaster’s an-c unfortunate, the
ahiihity to adjust to these em’ents tiy dissam’ing and thus
inipon-ting goods from abn’oad is prefer-abbe to n-educing
domnestic consumption. In extn-eme cases, the choice
may bebetween n-unning atn-ade deficit and starvation.
While natural disaster-s can exphain sonic tnade cte-
ficits, it is unlikely to explain the U.S. deficits in the
1980s, After all, this has been a period of fairly steady
income gn-owth.
The second alter-native suggested by identity 3) is a
rise in pi-im’ate investnient, caused hiy an expected rise
in the pn-oductivitv of domestic capital Inelatim’e to that
ovenseasl. Ttus alter-native is an extremel heahthiy sign
for the domestic economy. It indicates that the ex-
pected pn’ofitabilits’ ofinvestment was such that firms
were pn-epared to borrow in order to finance the
higher- investmenit. If pn-im’ate inim’estmnent exceeds pni—
m’ate savmnig Ifor a hialanced gom’en-nnient budget, the
pn-im’ate se:tnir must hon-n-ow fnoni om’en’seas. We have
seen aln-eady that nethiorrowimig from om’em-seas implies
a current account deficit in tIne hialamice (if paymenits.
“This can be derived as follows: GNP = C +I + G + CA from the
expenditure accounts, It is alsotrue that GNP = C-i-S± T from the
incomeaccounts,Sok-G-i-CA S+TandCA = (S—l)+(T—G).
If over-seas—financed gn’owtli in lim’im’ate inm’estment
lies behind the tmade deficit, we have to be car-eful iii
interpreting the statement that ttie tn-ade deficit is
associated with dissaving oran-eduction in wealth, It is
tnue that the pn-ivate sector’ wihl lie incn-easing its net
finamicial liahiilities Ion-reducing net financial assets. At
the same time, howevem, it is conm’entitig those hiabili—
ties into real capital. The return on that real capital is
expected to he gr-eaten- than the cost of thie hion-n’oim’ing.
Hence, this pn-owdes the basis fon’ income and wealth
gm-owth imi the future and, pn-esuniahih’, explaimis why
the United States had sinstained trade deficits
throughiout the second half of the 19th century, Rap-
idls’ gm-owing countries that attn’act capital from oven’—
seas tm’picahlv will have tnade deficits.
‘J’he final possibibity is that the current account
deficit nefiects the goven-nment budget deficit. (Jbvi-
ously, ifprivate sam-ing and investment wet-c equal, the
budget deficit and the current account cleficit would
be equal. We shall not pinnsue the question of whether
thehiudget deficit is “good” on- “bad” for’ the economy.
Assuming that the budget deficit represents the deliti—
crate choice of policvmakers, howem’er-, it follows that
the associated tnade deficit must tie pm-efern-ed to the
alter-natives.
‘l’hus, we ham’e seen that a rising curn’ent account
deficit must lie associated with eithen’a rise in invest-
ment n-elatim’e to saving IOn’ fall in sam’ing n-dative to
investment) or a n-ise in the budget deficit of the gom’-
en’nment. live already had seen that cinrrent account
deficits could result fioni excessive monetan’m’ expami-
sion, a case that is consistemit with identity 13): the
attemnpt to spend the excess monies’ will r-esult in
either a fall in S — I higher- consumption, lower saving
(in- higher inm’estmentl (in- a fall in T — C mon-c gom’en’n—
merit spending relative to taxes).
The EvidenceJbr the United State8
We niow look at the liossibbe causes of the U.S.
citnnenit account deficit. First, we considem’ the argu-
ment, favon-ed by Rican-do, of fast monetar gn-owth
associated with tugh domestic iniflationi, At first sight,
this appeam’s a hikely possibihits’. Monetary gn-owth ac-
cehenated after- 1982 icbian-t II at the same time as the
cinn’n-ent accoumit plunged into deficit ichan’t 2). Flom-m’—
em’er’, U.S. inflatiomi fell Icham’t 3I amid n’emained consist—
enithybelow the OECD aver-age during this pen-iod.Also,
both the n-cal and effective exchange n’ates appn-eciated
stn-omiglv unitil 1985. Thie inflation arid exchange n-ate
hieham’ior are signis of momietarv tightness, not mone—FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARYJEEBRUARY 1988
Chart I










1968 70 12 74 76 18 80 82 84 1986
NOTE~ The effective exchange rate is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ trade-weighted exchange rate, a weighted
index Im973=lool of the dollar’s value in terms of 10 industrial country currencies. The real effective exchange rate is
obtained by dividing the nominal effective exchange rote by the ratio of consumer price indexes (CPIj of the 10
industrial countries, ~trode-weighted, the some as the exchange ratesh to the CPI of the United States; all CPts ore
indexed to m973, m973=moo,
tan’v ease.” Onilv the high U.S. monies’ gn-owthi km 1986
looks consistent with Ricardo’s explanation: both the
n-caland nominal exchange rates fell dun’ing 1986. The
incn-ease in the tn-ade deficit in 1986, howem’em’, was
small. Hence, little weight can lie attached to the
momietaryexpbariationi ofthe tn-ade deficit. Indeed, mvhs’
the n’apid monies’ gn-owtli of 1982—86 did niot cn-eate
“It is possible that the Mundell model referred to above is relevant
here. This predicts that monetary tightness causes capital inflows, a
currency appreciation and a current account deficit. We think this
unlikely to be relevant here. There is no clear evidence of sufficient
monetary tightening over the entire I 981—86 period to explain what
happened. More importantly thesame outcome is predicted trom the
Mundell analysis as resulting from tiscal expansion. Hence mone-
tary neutrality combined with fiscal expansion would be sufficient. It
is the latter which seems to us todominate in this case.
inflation is still something (if a nnysterm’. Then-c was,
over this period, asignificant decline in the vebocits’of
cin’culationi, which meanis that the extn’a riioney bal-
ances were m-m’ilhingly h’meld rathem’ than spent domesti-
cabIs’.”
A mmdi mon-c plannsihile story enierges fionii aplot of
the prim’ate and public sector snnn’pluses Ichiart 2). No-
tice that we show hen-c I — S m-ather’ than S — I, hiec:amnse it
is easier to see its correspondence with 1’—C. Before
1982, the n’elationship lietween the public sector’ de-
ficit anid the pnvate sector sun-plus was n-emarkabilv
close. As a result, current account deficits and sur-
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puhilic sector- deficit staved high mm’h ile pn-im’ate inim’est—
mnent rose n’ehatim’e to primate saving. Bs’ 1986, the tin—
mate sector invested in excess of its savinig. tlenice, the
continued pubbir sector deficit is necessarils’ matched
hi’a cun’rent account deficit mif eqmnivabenit size. Insofar
as the goven-nmcnit linndget deficit is taken as given, the
n:hoices that the U.S. far:es are high lem’ehs (if pn-im’a)e
Inivestment and a trade deficit on’ halanced trade and
slow neal gn-omvthi
CONCLUSION
A nn-ade deficit arises mvhen a (:ountrm’ buys mon-c
fr-on om’erseas than foreigners bus’ fronim it. The coun—
terpan’t of a trade delicit mi the lialanicc of payments
accotnnits is an in cr-ease in hnin’n’om-m’in’mgs Ion’ n-ednnctinin in
net hermdingi from the nest of the won-Id. ‘l’n’ade deficits
comnld result fnonii I nflationan’vdomestic monietary pol-
icies: these is nio evidence, liowem’em’, that smnchi policies
are t lie cause of the (:mnn’reni t t/.S. trade deficit. I ni
genien-al, a tn-ade deficit mmnst he associated m-m-ithi sonne
combination nifprivate anid pmnhlic sector deficits. Until
1982, the limrdget deficit m-m’as approximately hnanred
his’ private sector smnr’plmrses. ‘the pm-esen) sitmnationi,
hoim’em’en-, is the inevitable resmnh t of the connbmniationi (if
a hmrdget deficit and high inm’estment n-cIa)Re to primate
saminig.
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